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Introduction
Checks on baseline
differences in randomized
controlled trials (RCTs) are often done using null-
hypothesis significance tests (NHSTs). In a quick
scan of recent publications in the journal
Psychology and Health, from 2015 to most recent
(accessed 4-2-2016), I noticed that it is common
for RCTs to include results of NHSTs on baseline
variables, and this tendency seems pervasive
throughout the literature. In itself, the enterprise
of establishing baseline similarity across conditions
is a worthwhile venture, since empirical
conclusions based on non-comparable samples
would hamper progress in the field. The ability of
RCTs to provide unbiased estimates of causal
relationships between variables is crucial for
scientific progress. Poor tests of theory, misguided
follow-up research, misapplication of theory in
practice, and waste of research funds: all hang in
the balance.That being said, the use of NHSTs to
establish the degree of baseline similarity is
inappropriate, potentially misleading (Altman &
Doré, 1990; De Boer, Waterlander, Kuijper,
Steenhuis, & Twisk, 2015; Roberts & Torgerson,
1999; Senn, 1994), and, simply, logically
incoherent.
NHSTs on baseline variables are often done
under the guise of ‘establishing whether
randomization was successful’, or ‘identifying
potential confounds and covariates to control for in
further analyses’. Despite a large number of authors
(e.g. Altman & Doré, 1990; Austin, Manca,
Zwarenstein, Juurlink, & Stanbrook, 2010; De Boer
et al. , 2015; Roberts & Torgerson, 1999; Senn,
1994) who have argued against the use NHSTs to
compare baseline differences in RCTs, or as basis for
covariate selection, the habit appears hard to
eradicate. De Boer et al. (2015) speculate that a
we-do-as-others-do tendency, perhaps a form of
Bandurian learning, might underlie the persistence
of researchers, reviewers, and editors to report and
request such tests.
In what follows, I discuss several issues related
to this practice, including 1) whether the use of
NHSTs as a method of checking randomization
procedures is appropriate, and 2) whether selection
of covariates is feasible on this basis. The
arguments described here are not new or complex,
but worth repeating given the persistent habit to
involve NHSTs in baseline comparisons. Alternatives
and suggestions for improvement on both of the
above points will be briefly discussed.
Testing for baseline differences
The CONSORT statement (Moher et al. , 2010), to
which many medical and epidemiological journals
adhere, explicitly states that NHSTs should not be
used to test for baseline differences. Instead,
descriptive information about baseline data across
conditions, combined with proper description of
randomization procedures should be given. This
statement does not simply follow arbitrary
convention, but is rooted in the logic that NHSTs
can only result in type I – errors (falsely rejecting a
true null hypothesis) . To illustrate this, consider
first that in a random assignment procedure the
samples are by definition drawn from the same
population, since all variables have the same
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expected means and distributions across samples.
For a given variable, both sample means are thus
estimators of the same population parameter. Of
course, in a single randomization, sample estimates
can show large fluctuations on specific baseline
variables; depending on the population standard
deviation ( ), and size (n) of the samples.
Accordingly, researchers often proceed testing
these observed baseline difference for significance,
and this is where practice runs into a logical
caveat. There is nothing against calculating
descriptive statistics to check baseline similarity
across groups, including an appropriate test–
statistic and a corresponding probability (p) . The p-
value then tells us something about how likely a
given baseline difference is, given that we are
randomizing individuals from the same population
into samples of size n1. However, to involve this p-
value in a null-hypothesis test against a rejection
criterion (a significance level of .05, say) - a move
towards inferential statistics - is logically
incoherent.
Consider a two-group t-test comparison on a
scale level baseline variable. To easily spot the
error, the tested null-hypothesis on baseline
similarity (i.e. h0: μ1=μ2), can also be phrased as:
“Both samples come from the same population”,
which – as described above- we already know is the
case given random assignment. Thus, when
researchers decide to reject the null-hypothesis of
baseline similarity in a RCT (given p <.05), they are
in effect implying that samples drawn from the
same population are not from the same
population2. Because this is a logical contradiction,
the only conclusion that follows from a significance
conclusion on baseline dissimilarity is that a Type-I
error has been made. Indeed, it seems quite bizarre
to examine the evidence against a null-hypothesis
that a priori we know to be true in RCTs.
The above argument, of course, hinges on the
notion that randomization used in a particular
study was in fact truly random (i.e. the study is in
fact a RCT). To determine this, researchers should
consider whether the procedure used to randomize
resulted in a given person drawn from the
population to have equal probability of being
assigned to each group. For example, a simple
randomization procedure in which a set of random
numbers is generated using computer software can
impossibly be biased – i.e. given a proper algorithm
underlying the number generator. To inform
reviewers and readers about whether
‘randomization was successful’, researchers should
thus refer to the method of randomization instead
of supplying NHSTs.
There are instances where a randomization
procedure does not guarantee that the samples in a
study reflect the same baseline population
originally randomized into an RCT. In this sense
randomization is a necessary, but not sufficient
reason to assume an unbiased estimate of an
experimental effect. For example, individuals with
specific characteristics might be more prone to
drop out in one of the conditions (due to the
condition). Such missing data resulting from non-
random drop out complicates matters further, and
might require additional steps in order to ensure an
unbiased estimate of an experimental effect
(Groenwold, Donders, Roes, Harrell, & Moons,
2012).
There are other (randomization-related)
circumstances where researchers would need to
control for baseline differences. In the case of non-
randomized pre-test / post-test designs, though,
the question is whether this should be done using
analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) or analysis of
variance (ANOVA) using change scores (see for
discussions, Van Breukelen, 2006, 2013). In RCTs,
the crucial point is that randomization issues – and
potential bias - can be anticipated by scrutinizing
the RCT methodologically (the potential for
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1 I leave aside, though, whether probability
information of finding specific sample differences in
a single randomization is actually informative.
2 This violates a fundamental doctrine of logic:
something either is, or is not, and if something is, it
cannot be that it is not.
selection bias, missing not at random, and the
chosen randomization method) and not statistically
using NHSTs.
Covariate selection in randomized
controlled trials
Although NHSTs on baseline variables are
meaningless in RCTs, this does not imply that
chance differences on baseline variables cannot
influence the estimate of an experimental effect.
In randomized studies, baseline variables (such as
demographics, trait measures, and pre-measures of
outcome variables) are very often included using
ANCOVA models, which applies a linear adjustment
to the experimental effect, correcting for between-
groups differences on the covariate. As discussed,
the decision to include a covariate should not be
made based on NHSTs. Moreover, this decision
should also not be based on probability values of
group differences on a potential covariate. Small p-
values for baseline differences do not imply that a
particular covariate is worth including a model.
Instead, the size of the association between
covariate and outcome (in terms of coefficient r, or
other standardized indices of effect size) are more
clear indicators of a covariate’s potential
contribution.
It is worth noting that the inclusion of
covariates in RCTs (due to randomization) rarely
alters conclusions about the size of an
experimental effect in the population, i.e. adjusts
for confounding. However, adjustment for
covariates might affect conclusions about the
significance of an experimental effect, due to the
resulting increase of statistical power by reduction
of error variance. The value of ANCOVA models in
RCTs, then, lies in the potential of covariates to
decrease the error variance in the outcome variable,
not so much in decreasing bias of the estimate of
an experimental effect (Van Breukelen & Van Dijk,
2007). This notion is of importance in deciding to
include covariates in the analyses, since an
imbalance of a covariate across conditions, i.e. the
association of a condition variable (X) and
covariate (C), is less relevant for the power to
detect an experimental effect than the strength of
the relationship between the covariate (C) and the
outcome variable (Y). The correlation between a
covariate and outcome is, thus, a more relevant
criterion for inclusion in a model than the
existence of baseline differences on the covariate.
When covariates are selected on the basis of
substantial influence (as opposed to significance)
on an outcome variable, it is unlikely that
researchers run into these in an exploratory
fashion. Instead, such variables are included in the
study protocol in the first place because of the
literature suggesting their relevance. In this sense,
covariate selection should always be confirmatory,
and be included in the study protocol and analysis
regardless of any baseline differences (Senn, 1994).
Inclusion of covariates on the basis of sample
information, indicating baseline dissimilarity across
conditions, or an unexpected effect on outcome (Y)
is at best statistically suspect, and is an
unwarranted form of covariate fishing. This habit
might lead meaningful covariates (with an
hypothesized, perhaps replicated effect on the
outcome variable) to decrease in their potential
contributions to the model. In addition, the
inclusion of such 'fished' covariates leads to a loss
of parsimony, and meaningless corrections to the
estimated experimental effect. In sum, two
suggestions for improvement of RCT analysis arise
from the above discussion:
1)There is no scientific justification for using
NHSTs as a tool to establish baseline
comparability; researchers should stop doing
it, and reviewers and editors should stop
asking for it.
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2)Covariate selection should be made solely a
priori and based on importance of association
– implying that covariates should be specified
in advance in the study protocol and listed in
papers’ methods sections.
These recommendations endorse those by
previous authors (e.g. Austin, Manca, Zwarenstein,
Juurlink, & Stanbrook, 2010; De Boer et al. , 2015;
Roberts & Torgerson, 1999; Senn, 1994). In
following these recommendations, researchers can
increase the statistical power to detect an
experimental effect in RCTs, and in a non-optimal
world of NHSTs this could potentially change a
dichotomous significance conclusion. But, the size
of experimental effects can (and should) be
interpreted independently from any covariates in
RCTs, using effect size indices, foremost those that
are insensitive to error variance magnitude (e.g.
eta-squared, though not a partial eta-squared3) . For
properly powered RCTs, interpretation of such
effect size indices is not affected by the inclusion
of a priori selected covariates (i.e. not beyond
inconsequential changes in the point estimate and
corresponding confidence intervals) . Therefore,
when discussion of results shifts the focus to such
indices instead of significance, this arguably
renders the use of ANCOVA models in RCTs of little
value altogether.
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